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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to measure the costs of drug prohibition in Australia 
and to examine the effects of prohibitionist drugs policy on the cannabis and heroin 
markets. The key argument will be that prohibition, rather than being a hinderance 
to the drugs black market, acts as an economic multiplier for the black market. 
Prohibition is a subsidy for the corrupt. 
 
This economic history was heavily influenced by Drugs, Crime & Society, the Report 
by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the National Crime Authority, hereafter 
referred to as the Cleeland Report (after its Chairman Peter Cleeland MP) which 
was the first government report to approach drugs as a commodity and to 
understand the drug trade as a market.1 It was a wonderfully numerate report: the 
first government report to estimate the size of drug markets, just as it was the first to 
estimate the cost of drug law enforcement.  
 
Because of their pioneering nature, Cleeland’s estimations were often rudimentary, 
back-of-the-envelope calculations, and later investigators, like Marks2 and Clement 
and Daryal,3 have refined these estimates. This paper continues the tradition of 
Cleeland revisionism, developing methods for calculating the value of the cannabis 
market and for estimating the cost of drug law enforcement, over a 25 year period. 
By comparing the value of the marijuana market and the cost of drug law 
enforcement over this period, this paper argues that the value of the cannabis black 
market has increased as a multiple of the cost of drug law enforcement. 
 
 
Keywords: Drug prohibition, economics; cannabis market, economics; drug law 
enforcement, cost of; heroin drought; marijuana drought; cannabis plague; heroin 
plague. 
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The Origins of the War on Drugs in Australia 
 
In his history of the US “War on Drugs”, Smoke and Mirrors,4 Dan Baum argues 
that, although the US began using police to control the use of drugs in 1914, the 
War on Drugs—in name and in spirit—began during Richard Nixon’s 1968 
presidential campaign. 
 
The Swinging Sixties was a decade of sexual promiscuity, youthful rebellion and 
new drugs like pot and LSD. But as the decade progressed, the intense division 
between young and old, caused by conscription and the Vietnam War, exploded. 
By the decade’s end, the sixties had become a time of riots on campus as a 
psychedelic counter-culture confronted the dominant culture.  
 
In this polarised atmosphere, Richard Nixon swept into office in the USA on a 
political platform of ‘Law and Order’. Since the counter-culture had chosen pot as 
its symbol, a global “War on Drugs” became an integral part of Nixon’s strategy to 
defeat Sixties radicalism. Nixon declared drugs ‘a modern curse of youth’ that was 
‘decimating a generation of Americans’. He promised his administration would 
accelerate the fight against illegal drugs with more federal drug agents, massive 
assistance to local police, a tripled Customs Service and anti-drug operations 
abroad. Where Lyndon Johnson declared a ‘War on Poverty’, Richard Nixon 
declared a ‘War on Drugs’. 5
 
Just as they supported Nixon’s foreign policy, right-wing Australian politicians, like 
Queensland premier Johannes Bjelke-Petersen and NSW premier Robert Askin, 
supported Nixon’s War on Drugs and called for a police crackdown on Australian 
youth culture. Following the fall of the Whitlam government in 1975, these right-
wing politicians launched a Nixon-style War on Drugs in Australia. Their application 
of US-style drugs policy to Australia would produce US-style drug problems in 
Australia. 
 
The War on Cannabis 
 
Australia’s illicit drug trade began with the cannabis plague of the 1960s and the War 
on Drugs in Australia was chiefly intended to stop cannabis use. The most extreme of 
the Drug War warriors was Queensland Premier Bjelke-Petersen, who ordered his 
police to drive marijuana users out of Queensland. After the Queensland police  
burned down the houses of the inhabitants of the hippie commune at Cedar Bay in 
1976, Bjelke-Petersen defended the police action, declaring he was “Tough on Drugs”. 
Bjelke-Petersen’s accomplice in the Cedar Bay raid was the young John Howard, then 
Minister for Business, with responsibility for the Narcotics Bureau, who has continued 
Bjelke-Petersen’s”Tough on Drugs” politics during his period as Prime Minister.6
 
The police crackdown on cannabis in 1976 led to a criminal takeover of drug dealing 
by Murray Riley and his gang, who were known as “the Double Bay Mob”. Previously, 
drug dealing was in the hands of a group of amateur drug enthusiasts, generally 
referred to as “the old Hippy network” who, in 1976, found themselves the targets of 
both the police and Murray Riley’s gang. 7
 
The murder of Donald Mackay8 in July 1977, apparently by the Mr Bigs of the drug 
trade, provoked enormous outrage and led to the formation of the NSW Royal 
Commission into Drug Trafficking (the Woodward royal commission) as well as a 
Commonwealth royal commission, the Australian Royal Commission into Drugs (the 
Williams royal commission). These investigations resulted in a marijuana drought, 
which was accompanied by a heroin plague. This marijuana drought lasted until the 
end of the Williams and Woodward royal commissions in 1979, after which the 
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marijuana market quickly recovered, though the price of marijuana rose steeply in 
subsequent years. (See Table 7.) 
 
The intensified criminalisation of cannabis users following the adoption of US War 
on Drugs politics by Australian politicians is demonstrated in the burgeoning 
number of cannabis and drug offences prosecuted between 1973 and 1982 (Table 
1). In the two years following July 1975, the number of cannabis offences more 
than doubled. This increase in cannabis prosecutions was driven by the politics of 
the War on Drugs. The decline in cannabis offences in 1978/79 and the 
comparatively small increase in 1977/78 reflect the marijuana drought and the 
activities of the Williams and Woodward royal commissions. Overall, six times as 
many cannabis offences were prosecuted in 1981/82 compared to 1973/74. 
 
Table 1: Drug offences and Cannabis offences in Australia 1973- 1982 
 
Year  Drug offences  Cannabis offences % increase 
1973/74  6,705   4,833     
1974/75  9,065   7,176   48%  
1975/76  15,847   13,008   81%  
1976/77  19,948   15,689   20%  
1977/78  23,068   17,977   15%  
1978/79  19,948   14,249   -20%  
1979/80  22,871   17,501   23%  
1980/81  24,515   20,278   16%  
1981/82  31,947   26,506   31%  
 
The major consequences of the war on cannabis were the criminal takeover of 
cannabis dealing, a massive increase in the price of cannabis, and the heroin plague.9 
This seems to be the pattern of prohibition: a police crackdown causes a temporary 
disruption of supply; lack of supply forces up price, increasing the value of the market 
and enticing more ruthless and organised criminals to take over. In this way, drug law 
enforcement acts as a multiplier for the drug market, while ensuring that control of the 
drug market goes to the most ruthless and “protected” members of organised crime 
like Murray Riley. 
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The War on Drugs and Prison Populations 
 
During the War on Drugs years young Australians found their private lives 
criminalised; and many thousands were sent to prison for drug offences. Australia’s 
rapidly increasing prison population is demonstrated in Graph 1.10
 
Graph 1: Prison Population Rates per 100,000 Population in Australia 
 
 
 
 
The War on Drugs was the major cause of the burgeoning prison population. In 
response to the Williams and Woodward royal commissions, most Australian states 
enacted harsh new drug laws in the mid 1980s. As a consequence, the last fifteen 
years of the twentieth century saw an unrivalled boom in prison populations in 
Australia, demonstrated in Graph 1: 
 
In less than two decades, the number of prisoners in Australia on drug offences 
increased from 688 in 1982 to 2150 in 2000 as Table 2 shows: 
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Table 2: No. of Prisoners in Australia on Drug Offences V Total Prison Population in 
Australia by Year11
 
Year  No. on Drug  % of Total  Total Prison  
   Offences  Population  Population 
1982  688   7.79   8830 
1983  683   7.55   9040 
1986  1236   10.75   11497 
1988  1351   10.96   12321 
1989  1297   10   12964 
1990  1301   9.1   14305 
1991  1322   8.8   15021 
1992  1447   9.3   15559 
1993  1697   10.7   15866 
1994  1948   11.5   16944 
1995  1935   11.1   17428 
1996  1874   10.3   18193 
1997  1875   9.8   19128 
1998  2409   12.1   19906 
1999  1960   9.1   21538 
2000  2150   9.9   21714  
 
The percentage of prisoners on drug offences reached 10% of prison population by 
1986, and has hovered round that level for the last two decades, even though the 
number of drug offenders in prison doubled in the same period. This is because the 
total prison population in Australia also doubled over these years. Many of these other 
offences were also ‘drug-related’ or ‘Prohibition-related’. An Age editorial suggested 
that two thirds of robberies and residential burglaries were drug-related and even that 
two thirds of prisoners in Australia were there for drug-related crimes.12 Although the 
exact percentage is unknown, a large percentage of the expanding prison population 
was in prison as a result of Australia’s drug laws. One consequence of this doubling of 
the prison population was a prison building boom in Australia in the 1990s, as 
nineteenth century prisons, like Brisbane’s Boggo Road, Adelaide Gaol and 
Melbourne’s Pentridge Prison, were replaced by a series of brand new US-style jails. 
For the prison industry, the War on Drugs created a once-in-a-century boom. 
 
The growth of the prison sector, and the money spent on law enforcement in Australia 
at the end of the twentieth century, can be seen from the following table: 
 
Table 3: Government Expenditure on Justice (in 1998/99 dollars) 13
 
Year   1994/5 1995/6 1996/7 1997/8 1998/9  real% 
Justice Sector  $m $m $m $m $m  increase 
Police services  3,252 3,451 3,596 3,636 3,971  5.1% 
Court admin-crim  354 355 336 361 383  2.0% 
Court admin-civic  344 362 414 416 449  6.9% 
Prisons   891 947 1,012 1,091 1,174  7.1% 
Total justice  4,842 5,115 5,359 5,504 5,977  5.4% 
 
The prison industry averaged 7.1% annual growth rate over the five years, becoming a 
billion-dollar industry in 1997. It continued to grow strongly, adding another $80 million 
each year thereafter. The money spent on police services increased greatly too, with 
an average annual growth rate of 5.1% over the same five years. By 1999 Australia 
was spending close to $4 billion on police services, and $6 billion on the total justice 
system: about 10% of this went directly on drug law enforcement; while an even larger 
amount was drug-related. 
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Problem One: Estimating the Cost of Drug Law Enforcement 
 
In the first 25 years of the War on Drugs in Australia, from January 1976 to December 
2000, close to one and a half million drug offences were prosecuted. How much 
money was spent arresting and prosecuting these million plus drug offences? 
 
The first official report to cost the amount spent by Australian governments on the war 
on drugs was the Cleeland Report, Drugs, Crime and Society, which attempted to 
estimate the drug law enforcement costs (police, customs, prisons, courts) for 
1987/88. Cleeland’s rudimentary costing of drug law enforcement were refined and 
revised by Robert E Marks in the chapter ‘Costs of the Prohibitions’ in Drugs Policy: 
Fact, Fiction and the Future edited by Russell Fox and Ian Mathews. Marks calculated 
the cost of drug law enforcement by estimating the percentage of time that police, 
courts, prisons and customs devoted to drug law enforcement, and he multiplied these 
percentages by the total money spent by police, courts, prisons and customs, then 
summed the total. In this way, Marks estimated the cost of Drug Law Enforcement in 
1988 was:14
 
Table 4: Drug Law Enforcement costs 1987-88: Marks estimate 
 
Australian Federal Police   $33.6 million 
National Crime Authority   $9.8 million 
Australian Customs Service  $6.9 million 
State Police    $64 million 
Prisons (recurrent)    $113.3 million 
Prisons (capital)    $42.3 million 
Courts (recurrent)    $43.5 million 
Courts (Legal Aid)    $5.9 million 
Total     $319.6 million   
 
This paper explores an alternative method of calculating the cost of drug law 
enforcement, but one which uses Marks as its basis. Obviously, the cost of drug law 
enforcement varies with the number of drug offences because each drug offence 
costs police, court and, often, prison time. The alternative equation is: 
 
Cost of Drug Law Enforcement = No. of drug offences X av. cost per drug offence 
 
In 1988 there were 49,070 drug offences and drug law enforcement costs, according 
to Marks, were $319.6 million, i.e. the average cost of drug law enforcement per drug 
offence was about $6,500 in $A1988. Using the CPI index and this figure, an average 
drug law enforcement cost per drug offence for any year can be calculated; and by 
multiplying this figure by the number of drug offences the cost of drug law enforcement 
can be calculated for any year. 
 
Table 5: Cost of Drug Law Enforcement by year 
 
Year  Drug Offences  Cost/Offence  Cost of Drug Law Enforcement 
1973  6,705  $1600   $10 m   
1982  31,947  $4275   $140 m 
1984  52,025  $4750   $250 m 
1988  49,070  $6500   $320 m 
1991   73,508  $7500   $550 m  
1998  85,000  $8500   $720 m  
 
How do the projections in Table 5 compare with other historic estimates? 
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It is important to note that researchers adopt different strategies for calculating the 
cost of drug law enforcement. Where Marks differed from many is by including a cost 
for Prisons (capital). This accounts for 13% of his total estimate, so that estimates 
based on Marks are often correspondingly higher than other estimates because the 
other estimates have not included the cost of building more prisons, as Marks has. 
More surprisingly, some other calculations fail to add in a cost for Customs (2% of 
Marks’ total). For a fair comparison, it is nearly always necessary to reduce the Marks 
derived estimate by 13% or 15% to account for the fact that other estimates have not 
included a costing for Prisons (capital) and Customs. 
 
For example in 1973, the Marks derived model estimated that the cost of drug law 
enforcement was $10 million and that the cost per drug offence was $1600. If we 
reduce this figure by 15% to remove the cost due to Prisons (capital) and Customs, 
the estimated cost per drug offence becomes $1360. By comparison, in 1975 the 
Cannabis Research Foundation’s Advisory Council, which included JJ McRoach, 
calculated the cost of drug law enforcement in 1974 at $10 million, based on 7,300 
offenders at an average cost of $1200 per drug offence for police and courts alone. 
Their prison costs were worked out separately, calculated at $65 per day for each day 
of prison (recurrent costs), and they did not include a cost for Prisons (capital) or 
Customs as Marks’ did. When their prison costs were included, the Cannabis 
Research Foundation estimated cost per drug offence was $1350. 
 
Going forward in time from 1988, the National Drug Strategy monograph The social 
costs of drug abuse in Australia in 1988 and 1992 by David Collins and Helen Lapsley 
estimated the cost of drug law enforcement in Australia for 1992 at $450 million. This 
was less than the Marks based estimate of $550 million, but again the difference is 
largely because there was no estimate for Prisons (capital) in the Collins and Lapsley 
estimate. If we again exclude Prisons (capital), the Marks-derived estimate becomes 
$480 million. The Collins and Lapsley estimate of the cost of drug law enforcement in 
1991/92 was:15  
 
Table 6: Collins and Lapsley’s estimate of Drug Law Enforcement costs in 1991/92  
 
Australian Federal Police    $43.6 million 
National Crime Authority    $19.9 million 
Australian Customs Service   $9 million 
State Police     $83.5 million 
Prisons (recurrent)     $230 million 
Prisons (capital)      na 
Courts (recurrent)     $64 million 
Courts (legal Aid)     na  
Total      $450 million 
 
Finally, consider the estimate that the cost of drug law enforcement was $720 million 
in 1998. Because our estimate of the cost of drug law enforcement includes costings 
for Prisons (capital) (13% of total) and Customs (2% of total), as well as costing for the 
Justice sector (prisons, police and courts), we need to reduce our drug law 
enforcement cost by 15% to obtain the Justice sector only component of drug law 
enforcement, estimated at $612 million in 1998. Table 3 (above) shows that the total 
cost of the Justice sector in Australia was about $6,000 million dollars in 1998/99. If 
the Justice sector component of drug law enforcement spending was $612 million, this 
would mean that drug law enforcement was 10.2% of total Justice sector spending. By 
comparison, Table 2 (above) shows that prisoners on drug offences represented 
12.1% of total prison population in Australia in 1998, and that 10.1% of prisoners in 
Australian jails were there for drug offences between 1996 and 2000.  
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Since about 1,500, 000 drug offences were prosecuted between 1976 and 2000 at an 
average cost per drug offence of $8500 in $1998A, this suggests that about $13 billion 
(in 1998 dollars) was spent on drug prohibition in the period between 1976 and 2000. 
 
 9
 
Problem Two: Estimating the value of the cannabis market 
 
Australia’s cannabis trade is the nation’s oldest and largest illicit drug trade. Marijuana 
smoking in Australia exploded during the 1960s following the discovery of a wild 
cannabis infestation in the Hunter Valley, north of Sydney. After 1967, Australia’s 
marijuana market was supplied by US troops on ‘rest and recreation’ leave from 
Vietnam who flew in with some of the best pot on the planet. Although the number of 
smokers in the first decade of Australian marijuana smoking is unknown, from 1973 
onwards, there are a number of nation-wide surveys (McNair 1973, 1977; Morgan 
1979, 1982, 1984; NCADA/NDS 1985, 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1998) which allow us 
to estimate the number of Australians who smoked marijuana in the last year.  
 
These population figures on ‘recent users’ can be used for an estimation of the size of 
the Australian marijuana market. Obviously, the amount of cannabis smoked in 
Australia increases proportionally to the number of Australians smoking cannabis. 
Mathematically, the size and value of the marijuana market for any particular year can 
be calculated using the following equations: 
 
Estimated yearly market size = No. smokers X Green Mean; 
Estimated Market Value = No. smokers X Green Mean X price/oz; 
where the Green Mean represents the amount of pot smoked by the average 
Australian cannabis smoker in a year.  
 
Drugs, Crimes and Society, the report by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the 
National Crime Authority, chaired by Peter Cleeland MP, was the first government 
report to estimate the size of the Australian marijuana market, and their figure can be 
used to calculate the Green Mean. By definition, the Green Mean equals the amount 
of pot smoked in a year in Australia divided by the number of smokers. The Cleeland 
Report estimated the size of the Australian cannabis market in 1988 at 120 tonnes of 
cannabis. The population surveys for that year, show that there were 1,500,000 
Australians who smoked pot in 1988. By dividing Cleeland’s 1988 ‘guesstimate’ by the 
number of smokers in 1988 the Green Mean can be calculated at 80 grams (about 3 
ounces) per annum. Note this is an average for ALL users, not for heavy users.  
 
Table 7, The Australian Marijuana Industry Chart, 1973-1998, is compiled from a 
number of historical sources. The number of smokers is a calculation based on a 
series of nation-wide surveys between 1973 and 1998. Estimated market size for any 
year is based on the Cleeland Report, and assumes a standard market size of 120 
tonnes in 1988. This is multiplied by the ratio of the number of smokers in that 
particular year divided by the number of smokers in 1988. The figure for price is based 
on a number of historical sources. The 1988 projections agree with the Cleeland 
Report, which is the measure used to estimate the other years. Because the years 
between 1977 and 1979 were the years of the marijuana drought/heroin plague that 
followed the launch of the War on Drugs in 1976, no estimate is made for the value of 
the market in these years. 
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Table 7: The Australian Marijuana Industry Chart, 1973-1998  
 
Year     No. Smokers Survey   Market Size  Price/Oz  Value ($ml) 
1973  500,000  McNair   40 tonnes  $30  $40m 
1977  675,000  McNair   55 tonnes  $30  drought 
1979  750,000  Morgan  60 tonnes  $50  drought 
1982  975,000   Morgan  77 tonnes  $200  $550m 
1984  1,175,000 Morgan/NCADA   94 tonnes  $300  $1020m 
1988  1,500,000 Morgan/NCADA 120 tonnes  $450  $1,900m 
1991  1,625,000 NCADA  130 tonnes  $450  $2,000m 
1993  1,666,000 NCADA  135 tonnes  $450  $2,200m 
1995  1,850,000 NCADA  150 tonnes  $450  $2,400m 
1998  2,700,000 NCADA  210 tonnes  $400  $3,200m 
 
During 25 years of the War on Drugs the value of the cannabis market increased by 
an astonishing 7500%. A large part of this rise was due to the rapid increase in the 
price of cannabis caused by the War on Drugs, as Table 7 shows. It also 
demonstrates what little long-term effect the War on Drugs had on cannabis 
comsumption in Australia after the initial years of drought. Critics of prohibition have 
argued that prohibition creates a “forbidden fruit” syndrome that perversely 
glamorises drug use. On the evidence, this seems plausible. Rather than declining 
under a rigorous regime of prohibition, cannabis use increased by 440%. Although 
prohibitionists argued that tough new drug laws would curb cannabis use, cannabis 
use amongst the young increased dramatically, possibly because it was illegal. 
 
Comparison with other estimates of the size of Australia’s cannabis market 
 
The traditional method for estimating the size of the marijuana market through 
consumption figures was pioneered by the Cleeland Report, and was based on the 
idea that those who used cannabis most were responsible for most of the cannabis 
consumed. Therefore, you could estimate the size of the market by the equation: 
 
Size of the cannabis market = No. heavy smokers X average consumption of heavy 
user.  
 
The method presented in this paper, the Green Mean model, is a different 
consumption model, which uses for its estimation of the cannabis market the number 
of recent users (all those who used cannabis at least once in the last year) rather than 
calculating from the heavy users figures (those who use cannabis several times a 
week or daily). The reason the Green Mean model was developed was because 
recent cannabis use (used in last year) has been measured by a series of polls in 
Australia, dating back to 1973; whereas the Cleeland equation depends on polls 
measuring heavy cannabis use, which do not exist before 1988. So the Green Mean 
model can estimate the size of the market back to 1973, unlike the Cleeland model, 
which is of no use beyond 1988.  
 
However, the Green Mean model is calibrated on the Cleeland committee’s estimation 
of the size of the marijuana market in 1988 at 120 tonnes and this estimation was 
challenged by Clements and Daryal in their 1999 discussion paper, The Economics of 
Marijuana Consumption. The 1988 Cleeland estimation was another back-of-the-
envelope calculation which Clements and Daryal turned into a rigorous, economic 
history of Australia’s marijuana market by employing the National Drug Strategy 
Household Survey polls from 1988, 1991, 1993 and 1995 to determine the number of 
heavy users. They then used Cleeland’s heavy-user equation to estimate the size and 
value of the Australian marijuana market between 1988 and 1995. Because Clements 
and Daryal used different polls and different consumption figures to Cleeland, they 
came up with an estimate for the size of the market in 1988 of 8,460,000 ounces, 
about 240 tonnes, twice Cleeland’s estimate. If they were correct, the Green Mean 
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should be 160 grams a year. Obviously, my choice of an 80 gram Green Mean shows 
I consider that Clements and Daryal overestimate consumption by a factor of two. 
 
My major criticism of Clements and Daryal’s model, and the reason I reject the 160 
gram Green Mean, is that they over-estimated the cannabis consumption of heavy 
users. Their model suggests that heavy cannabis users in 1988 spent $160 per week 
on cannabis. If this were true, heavy cannabis users would need to resort to crime like 
heroin users to maintain such expensive habits. The comparison between the Green 
Mean model (based on an 80 gram Green Mean as well as a 160 gram Green Mean) 
and Clements and Daryal’s model of the size of the Australian marijuana market is 
given in Table 8. 16
 
Table 8: Size of the Australian Marijuana Market 1988-1995 (in thousands of ounces) 
Green Mean model versus Clements and Daryal 
 
Year   1988 1991 1993 1995 
Clements and Daryal 8460 11381 9983 11271 
Green Mean (80g) 4300 4660 4840 5380 
Green Mean (160g) 8600 9320 9680 10760 
 
 12
 
Drug Law Enforcement as a Multiplier of the Black Market 
 
Combining Table 5 with Table 7 gives us Table 9 which compares the cost of law 
enforcement with the value of the cannabis black market for any year. It shows how 
law enforcement acts as a subsidy for the cannabis black market. Multiplying the cost 
of drug law enforcement by about four gives a reasonably accurate estimate of the 
value of the marijuana market. 
 
Table 9: Value of cannabis market V Cost of drug law enforcement 
 
Year  $Value of Cannabis Market Cost of Drug Law Enforcement 
1973  $40m    $10m 
1977  drought    $60m 
1979  drought     $100m 
1982  $550m     $140m 
1984  $1020m   $250m 
1988  $1,900m   $320m 
1991  $2,000m   $550m 
1998  $3,,200m   $720m 
 
Between 1973 and 1998, every dollar spent on drug law enforcement in Australia 
simply added another four dollars to the cannabis black market; with the exception of 
1988, when each dollar of drug law enforcement was worth six dollars for the cannabis 
black market! The explanation for this curious phenomenon is that the price of 
cannabis increased with the level of prohibition, moving from $30 an ounce in 1977 to 
$450 an ounce in 1988.  
 
Because Prohibition is a supply side solution, all that is achieved by increasing the 
amount spent on drug law enforcement is to increase the price of the drug, so the 
value of the black market rises as a multiple of drug law enforcement. For example, if 
we reduced the amount spent on drug law enforcement to almost nothing (that is, if we 
abandoned prohibition), the price of drugs would fall to a level where the black market 
would collapse. Like all products, the price of illicit drugs is determined by the costs 
involved in getting the drugs to market. In a situation of prohibition, most of that cost is 
created by drug law enforcement. 
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Australia’s Heroin Plague 1976-2000 
 
The uncertain purity of black market heroin, which can range from 10% to 100%, 
combined with the low dosage required for a lethal overdose, make heroin 
particularly fatal under prohibition. Just as the failure of drug prohibition in Australia 
is mirrored in the graph of Australia’s expanding prison populations, the failure of 
heroin prohibition in Australia is measured in Graph 2, Opioid overdose mortality 
rates among people aged 15-44 in Australia 1965 –1997. Before the launch of the 
War on Drugs, Australia had only a handful of opiate overdoses. By targeting 
cannabis, the War on Drugs produced a marijuana drought in 1977, which in turn 
generated a heroin plague. Opioid overdose deaths climbed steeply after 1976, 
reaching one hundred and fifty by 1977. Despite extreme penalties for heroin 
offenders, including the execution of drug couriers Barlow and Chambers, opioid 
overdoses continued to increase over the next two decades, peaking in 1999 under 
the ‘Tough on Drugs’ policies of Prime Minister John Howard at 958. That year over 
1100 young Australians died as a result of illicit drug overdoses. Since the primary 
aim of sensible drugs policy is to minimise drug deaths, this measure of the 
thousands of young lives lost to drug overdoses in Graph 2 remains the greatest 
indictment of Australia’s prohibitionist drugs policy. 17
 
Graph 2 
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The Causes of the 2001 Heroin Drought 
 
The number of fatal overdoses has since fallen to about 400 per year in 2002  
because of the heroin drought, which started in January 2001, which has been 
accompanied by a methamphetamine plague. The heroin drought/methamphet-
amine plague of 2001 provokes comparisons with the marijuana drought/heroin 
plague of 1977, the most obvious being that drought conditions in one drug created 
the ideal conditions for a new drug plague.  
 
The fall in overdose deaths has been accompanied by much boasting by the 
Howard government who now claim their drug policies are a success because they 
have reduced drug overdose deaths from 1100 per year! What they don’t say is that 
it was as a result of their own disastrous drugs policy that 1100 young Australians 
died of drug overdoses in 1999.  
 
Following the lead of the Howard government, AFP Police Commissioner Mick 
Keelty now claims responsibility for the heroin drought due to successful drug law 
enforcement. However, before the heroin drought, Commissioner Keelty predicted 
it, claiming that southeast Asian drug lords were moving out of heroin into 
methamphetamine because the penalties involved were lower and because 
methamphetamines were easier to produce than heroin and more profitable.  
 
If police seizures caused the heroin drought of 2001, then a very large section of the 
market had to be seized; so we would expect to find a series of large heroin 
seizures in the year before 2001 which precipitated the heroin drought. To be large 
enough to cause a drought, these seizures would have to be record-breaking, the 
biggest seizures of all time (because no other series of seizures has caused a 
comparable drought). However, although the heroin drought began around January 
2001, the seizure figures for 2000 are small in comparison to previous years; about 
two thirds of 1999, and one third of the amount seized in 1998; and only the fouth 
highest of the decade.  
 
The largest seizure of heroin in Australian history was 390 kilos seized in October 
1998,18 which was estimated by Customs as 8 million hits and worth $300 million 
“street value”; yet even a seizure of this magnitude (twice the size of the total 
seizures for 2000!) did not cause a drought. As the figures on opioid overdoses 
show, the following years, 1999 and 2000, were the peak years of heroin 
consumption in Australia with prices low and purity high. Not only did the number of 
opioid overdoses double between 1995 and 2000, consumption of heroin in 
Australia also doubled during these years. 19
 
While demand for heroin in Australia doubled in the five years before January 2001, 
production of heroin from the Golden Triangle, the major source of heroin for 
Australia, declined significantly because of a long drought. The Australian Illicit Drug 
Report described the shortage of opium in Myanmar (Burma) in 2000 due to the 
poor 1999 growing season: 
 
“Severe drought in Myanmar’s poppy growing areas – principally northern and 
southern Shan state - caused production and cultivation to decline significantly in 
1999; the third year in a row … Myanmar’s estimated gum opium potential was 
almost 38% lower than in 1998 and almost half the average annual potential area 
for 1991 to 1999 …” 20
 
The most spectacular decline in opium production occurred in Afghanistan: from an 
estimated 89,172 hectares in 2000 to an estimated 7606 hectares in 2001; a 
reduction of 91%. Afghanistan produced an estimated 79% of the world’s illicit 
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opium in 1999, but this dropped to 70% in 2000, following a decree issued by the 
Taliban authorities in September 1999, requiring all opium-growers to reduce output 
by one-third. A second decree, issued in July 2000, required farmers to completely 
stop opium cultivation.21 Given this decline in Asian opium production, the Australian 
heroin drought should be no surprise. 
 
The causes of the heroin drought in Australia in January 2001 include: an enormous 
rise in the amount of heroin consumed in Australia; a significant decline in opium 
production in south-east Asia due to drought; a move away from heroin towards 
methamphetamine production by Asian drug gangs; and the Taliban’s crackdown on 
Afghani opium. 
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Conclusion 
 
Between January 1976 and December 2000, Australian governments spent in the 
order of $13 billion prosecuting about one and a half million drug offences with the 
purpose of reducing drug use. However, drug prohibition did not reduce illicit drug 
use; instead it created an enormous black market, spiralling prison populations and 
a plague of heroin overdoses. 
 
The futility of prohibition was demonstrated even in “successes” like the marijuana 
drought of 1977, which created the conditions for the heroin plague, and the heroin 
drought of 2001, which led to the current methamphetamine plague. On the two 
occasions they have occurred, droughts have only acted as incubators for a new 
drug plague. 
 
Prohibition is a cure that makes the disease worse. It aims to stop the use of drugs, 
but instead, it glamorises drug use. It aims to morally improve the drug user, but 
instead, it corrupts society. Under the rule of morals improvers and “War on Drugs” 
advocates like Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen and Sir Robert Askin, states like Queensland 
and New South Wales descended to levels of corruption that made their police 
forces a public scandal. Rather than being suppressed by the police, the drug trade 
thrived and became the lucrative fiefdom of corrupt detectives and their close 
friends; so that, even though more people went to jail for drugs each year, every 
year there were more drugs on the street. 
 
At the start of the War on Drugs, free market economist, Milton Friedman, declared 
that the failure of prohibition was inevitable because of corruption as officials 
succumbed to the lure of easy money: Said Friedman: “So long as large sums of 
money are involved—and they are bound to be if drugs are illegal—it is literally 
hopeless to expect to end the traffic or even to reduce seriously its scope.”22 As this 
paper shows, money spent on drug prohibition simply acts as a multiplier for the 
drug market, increasing the amount available for perverting officials. It is this 
capacity of the black market to corrupt the gatekeepers that causes prohibition to 
fail year after year. The result is the entrenched system of corruption whereby the 
drug trade continues under the protection of corrupt police. 
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